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ETPF Research Phase 5
Tax policy
in an uncertain world
The allocation of profits and the OECD approach to business restructuring
Christopher Heady
The allocation of the profits of multi-national groups between their member
companies for tax purposes has important impacts on both the corporate tax
revenues of the countries in which these groups operate and the taxes paid by
the groups. The current international tax system allocates these profits using
separate accounting, based on the “arms length principle”. However, this
approach has been criticised at both a practical level and a conceptual level,
and many of these criticisms have been highlighted by recent trends in business
restructuring.
In this context, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic
consequences of the arms length principle and to illustrate the issues raised in
this analysis with elements of the OECD approach to the transfer-pricing aspects
of business restructuring. The paper argues that the arms length principle
achieves a reasonably fair allocation of tax base between countries and promotes
the important efficiency principle of ownership neutrality, especially now that
most OECD countries use the exemption method to relieve international double
taxation. However, in the absence of tax harmonisation, it does not ensure that
capital is allocated efficiently between countries. The main difficulties with
the arms length principle arise in the context of intangible property and
intra-group services, issues that arise commonly in the restructuring of
multi-national companies. Particular additional problems that arise in
restructuring are the compensation of subsidiaries for lost profit opportunities
and the treatment of risk. The paper concludes that, while the arms length
principle is far from perfect, many of its difficulties would also arise in some
form under formulary apportionment (the most widely supported alternative). It
is only more radical reforms of international corporate taxation that can solve
these problems, but they would fundamentally alter the allocation of tax bases
between countries.
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Foreign direct investment and corporate income
taxation under legal uncertainty
Martin Zagler
This paper analyzes the effects of legal uncertainty in the application of
double tax agreements on foreign direct investment in developing economies.
Despite the fact that we would suppose that the existence of a double tax
agreement should encourage foreign direct investment, the literature is
surprisingly inconclusive and more often than not finds a negative or
insignificant relationship. We explain this stylized fact by taking legal
uncertainty into account. We will study a general equilibrium model of foreign
investors who consider investing in a profitable developing market. Uncertainty
arises due to uncertainty about the application of tax treaties. The entry
decision will be undertaken strategically, taking the behavior of other market
participants into account. Depending on the industry structure, firms may decide
to enter until economic rents are zero in the low tax scenario. Companies that
compete with each other may underbid each other, speculating that legal
uncertainty resolves in their favor. This will lead to a race to the bottom
between foreign direct investors and harmful competition. A double tax agreement
with a high degree of legal uncertainty can therefore be worse for the host
company (and the involved firms) than a fully implemented agreement or no
agreement at all.
Taxation and the financial crisis
Julian Alworth and Giampaolo Arachi
This paper is divided into two broad sections. The first examines those
elements of the tax system that may have contributed to the crisis. It suggests
that there are a number of weaknesses in existing arrangements, some of which
have long been known (such as the propensity for tax systems to encourage
leverage) while others (such as the excessive reliance on the financial sector
and its ephemeral earnings for tax revenue projections) have only become
apparent with the benefit of hindsight. The discussion is organized around the
tax treatment of households (in particular the deductibility of mortgage
interest), non-financial corporate entities (leverage) and financial
institutions.
The second part of the paper is more tentative; it discusses policy initiatives
in respect of the financial sector that are currently being aired. These policy
initiatives have been organized under three broad (and often overlapping)
headings: (i) special taxes on the financial sector to recover the costs
incurred for the bailout; (ii) the use of taxes to correct for distortions
(particularly of systemic character) resulting from the safety net which applies
to the financial sector; (iii) reforms in the taxation of the financial sector
which have been highlighted by the crisis (VAT on financial services, the
interaction with accounting and regulatory definitions of income, anti-avoidance
measures in particular with respect to tax arbitrage).
How do taxes affect cross-border acquisitions?
Wiji Arulampalam, Michael Devereux & Federica Liberini
This paper uses firm-level data to investigate the impact of taxes on the
location of mergers and acquisitions. Our theoretical framework suggests that
there are many ways in which tax can influence such M&A activity. For example,
it is possible that a higher tax rate in the country of the target company could
make an acquisition of the tax more likely, less likely, or have no effect at
all. Another possibility is that the difference between the home and host
country tax rates has an effect. We combine financial and ownership data from a
large number of companies in the ORBIS database for 2005 with domestic and
cross-border acquisitions in the ZEPHYR database between 2006 and 2008. We
estimate a model in which acquiring companies choose in which country to acquire
a target company. The results suggest that the predominant effect is that a
higher tax rate in the target country has a negative impact on the probability
of an acquisition in that country.
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